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In this paper we obtain sufficient and necessary conditions on the number of sam-
ples required for exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of
a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions. We consider sparse linear
influence games — a parametric class of graphical games with linear payoffs, and
represented by directed graphs of n nodes (players) and in-degree of at most k. We
show that one can efficiently recover the PSNE set of a linear influence game with
O (k2 log n) samples, under very general observation models. On the other hand, we
show that Ω (k log n) samples are necessary for any procedure to recover the PSNE
set from observations of joint actions.
1. Introduction and Related Work
Non-cooperative game theory is widely considered as an appropriate mathematical framework
for studying strategic behavior in multi-agent scenarios. In Non-cooperative game theory, the
core solution concept of Nash equilibrium describes the stable outcome of the overall behavior
of self-interested agents — for instance people, companies, governments, groups or autonomous
systems — interacting strategically with each other and in distributed settings.
Over the past few years, considerable progress has been made in analyzing behavioral data
using game-theoretic tools, e.g. computing Nash equilibria [1, 2, 3], most influential agents
[4], price of anarchy [5] and related concepts in the context of graphical games. In political
science for instance, Irfan and Ortiz [4] identified, from congressional voting records, the most
influential senators in the U.S. congress — a small set of senators whose collective behavior
forces every other senator to a unique choice of vote. Irfan and Ortiz [4] also observed that the
most influential senators were strikingly similar to the gang-of-six senators, formed during the
national debt ceiling negotiations of 2011. Further, using graphical games, Honorio and Ortiz [6]
showed that Obama’s influence on Republicans increased in the last sessions before candidacy,
while McCain’s influence on Republicans decreased.
The problems in algorithmic game theory described above, i.e., computing the Nash equilibria,
computing the price of anarchy or finding the most influential agents, require a known graphical
game which is not available apriori in real-world settings. Therefore, Honorio and Ortiz [6]
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proposed learning graphical games from behavioral data, using maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) and sparsity-promoting methods. On the other hand, Garg and Jaakkola [7] provide
a discriminative approach to learn a class of graphical games called potential games. Honorio
and Ortiz [6] and Irfan and Ortiz [4] have also demonstrated the usefulness of learning sparse
graphical games from behavioral data in real-world settings, through their analysis of the voting
records of the U.S. congress as well as the U.S. supreme court.
In this paper, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for recovering the PSNE set of a
graphical game in polynomial time. We also generalize the observation model from Ghoshal and
Honorio [8], to arbitrary distributions that satisfy certain mild conditions. Our polynomial time
method for recovering the PSNE set, which was proposed by Honorio and Ortiz [6], is based
on using logistic regression for learning the neighborhood of each player in the graphical game,
independently. Honorio and Ortiz [6] showed that the method of independent logistic regression
is likelihood consistent; i.e., in the infinite sample limit, the likelihood estimate converges to the
best achievable likelihood. In this paper we obtain the stronger guarantee of recovering the true
PSNE set exactly.
Finally, we would like to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that `1-regularized logistic
regression has been analyzed by Ravikumar et. al. [9] in the context of learning sparse Ising
models. Apart from technical differences and differences in proof techniques, our analysis of
`1-penalized logistic regression for learning sparse graphical games differs from Ravikumar et.
al. [9] conceptually — in the sense that we are not interested in recovering the edges of the true
game graph, but only the PSNE set. Therefore, we are able to avoid some stronger conditions
required by Ravikumar et. al. [9], such as mutual incoherence.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we provide some background information on graphical games introduced by
Kearns et. al. [10].
2.1. Graphical Games
A normal-form game G in classical game theory is defined by the triple G = (V,X ,U) of players,
actions and payoffs. V is the set of players, and is given by the set V = {1, . . . , n}, if there
are n players. X is the set of actions or pure-strategies and is given by the Cartesian product
X def= ×i∈V Xi, where Xi is the set of pure-strategies of the i-th player. Finally, U def= {ui}ni=1, is
the set of payoffs, where ui : Xi ×j∈V \i Xj → R specifies the payoff for the i-th player given its
action and the joint actions of the all the remaining players.
An important solution concept in the theory of non-cooperative games is that of Nash equi-
librium. For a non-cooperative game, a joint action x∗ ∈ X is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE) if, for each player i, x∗i ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi ui(xi,x∗−i), where x∗−i = {x∗j |j 6= i}. In other
words, x∗ constitutes the mutual best-response for all players and no player has any incentive to
unilaterally deviate from their optimal action x∗i given the joint actions of the remaining players
x∗−i. The set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for a game G is defined as follows:
NE(G) =
{
x∗
∣∣(∀i ∈ V ) x∗i ∈ argmax
xi∈Xi
ui(xi,x
∗
−i)
}
. (1)
Graphical games, introduced by Kearns et al. [10], are game-theoretic analogues of graphical
models. A graphical game G is defined by the directed graph, G = (V,E), of vertices and directed
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edges (arcs), where vertices correspond to players and arcs encode “influence” among players,
i.e., the payoff of the i-th player only depends on the actions of its (incoming) neighbors.
2.2. Linear Influence Games
Irfan and Ortiz [4] and Honorio and Ortiz [6], introduced a specific form of graphical games, called
Linear Influential Games, characterized by binary actions, or pure strategies, and linear payoff
functions. We assume, without loss of generality, that the joint action space X = {−1,+1}n.
A linear influence game between n players, G(n) = (W,b), is characterized by (i) a matrix of
weights W ∈ Rn×n, where the entry wij indicates the amount of influence (signed) that the j-th
player has on the i-th player and (ii) a bias vector b ∈ Rn, where bi captures the prior preference
of the i-th player for a particular action xi ∈ {−1,+1}. The payoff of the i-th player is a linear
function of the actions of the remaining players: ui(xi,x−i) = xi(wT−ix−i − bi), and the PSNE
set is defined as follows:
NE(G(n)) = {x|(∀i) xi(wT−ix−i − bi) ≥ 0} , (2)
where w−i denotes the i-th row of W without the i-th entry, i.e. w−i = {wij |j 6= i}. Note
that we have diag(W) = 0. Thus, for linear influence games, the weight matrix W and the
bias vector b, completely specify the game and the PSNE set induced by the game. Finally, let
G(n, k) denote a sparse game over n players where the in-degree of any vertex is at most k.
3. Problem Formulation
Now we turn our attention to the problem of learning graphical games from observations of
joint actions only. Let NE∗ def= NE(G∗(n, k)). We assume that there exists a game G∗(n, k) =
(W∗,b∗) from which a “noisy” data set D = {x(l)}ml=1 of m observations is generated, where each
observation x(l) is sampled independently and identically from some distribution P. We will use
two specific distributions Pg and Pl, which we refer to as the global and local noise model, to
provide further intuition behind our results. In the global noise model, we assume that a joint
action is observed from the PSNE set with probability qg ∈ (|NE∗|/2n, 1), i.e.
Pg(x) = qg1 [x ∈ NE
∗]
|NE∗| +
(1− qg)1 [x /∈ NE∗]
2n − |NE∗| . (3)
In the above distribution, qg can be thought of as the “signal” level in the data set, while 1− qg
can be thought of as the “noise” level in the data set. In the local noise model we assume
that the joint actions are drawn from the PSNE set with the action of each player corrupted
independently by some Bernoulli noise. Then in the local noise model the distribution over joint
actions is given as follows:
Pl(x) = 1|NE∗|
∑
y∈NE∗
n∏
i=1
q
1[xi=yi]
i (1− qi)1[xi 6=yi], (4)
where qi > 0.5. While these noise models were introduced in [6], we obtain our results with
respect to very general observation models, satisfying only some mild conditions. A natural
question to ask then is that: “Given only the data set D and no other information, is it possible
to recover the game graph?” Honorio and Ortiz [6] showed that it is in general impossible to learn
the true game G∗(n, k) from observations of joint actions only because multiple weight matrices
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W and bias vectors b can induce the same PSNE set and therefore have the same likelihood under
the global noise model (3) — an issue known as non-identifiablity in the statistics literature. It
is also easy to see that the same holds true for the local noise model. It is, however, possible to
learn the equivalence class of games that induce the same PSNE set. We define the equivalence
of two games G∗(n, k) and Ĝ(n, k) simply as :
G∗(n, k) ≡ Ĝ(n, k) iff NE(G∗(n, k)) = NE(Ĝ(n, k)).
Therefore, our goal in this paper is efficient and consistent recovery of the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria set (PSNE) from observations of joint actions only; i.e., given a data set D, drawn
from some game G∗(n, k) according to the distribution P, we infer a game Ĝ(n, k) from D such
that Ĝ(n, k) ≡ G∗(n, k).
4. Method and Results
In order to efficiently learn games, we make a few assumptions on the probability distribution
from which samples are drawn and also on the underlying game.
4.1. Assumptions
The following assumption ensures that the distribution P assigns non-zero mass to all joint
actions in X and that the signal level in the data set is more than the noise level.
Assumption 1. There exists constants p˜min, p˜max and pmax such that the data distribution P
satisfies the following:
0 <
p˜min
2n − |NE∗| ≤ P(x) ≤
p˜max
2n − |NE∗| ,∀x ∈ X \ NE
∗,
p˜max
2n − |NE∗| < P(x) ≤ pmax ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ NE
∗.
To get some intuition for the above assumption, consider the global noise model. In this case
we have that p˜min = p˜max = (1 − qg), pmax = qg/|NE∗|, and ∀x ∈ NE∗, P(x) = pmax. For the
local noise model, consider, for simplicity, the case when there are only two joint actions in the
PSNE set: NE∗ = {x1,x2}, such that x11 = +1, x21 = −1 and x1i = x2i = +1 for all i 6= 1. Then,
p˜min = 0.5 × (1 − q2) × . . . × (1 − qn) × (2n − 2), p˜max = 0.5 × (1 − qj)(
∏
i/∈{j,1} qi) × (2n − 2),
where qj = min{q2, . . . , qn}, and pmax = 0.5× q2 × . . . qn.
Our next assumption concerns with the minimum payoff in the PSNE set.
Assumption 2. The minimum payoff in the PSNE set, ρmin, is strictly positive, specifically:
xi(w
∗
−i
Tx−i − bi) ≥ ρmin > 5Cmin/Dmax (∀ x ∈ NE∗),
where Cmin > 0 and Dmax are the minimum and maximum eigenvalue of the expected Hessian
and scatter matrices respectively.
Note that as long as the minimum payoff is strictly positive, we can scale the parameters
(W∗,b∗) by the constant 5Cmin/Dmax to satisfy the condition: ρmin > 5Cmin/Dmax, without chang-
ing the PSNE set. Indeed the assumption that the minimum payoff is strictly positive is is
unavoidable for exact recovery of the PSNE set in a noisy setting such as ours, because oth-
erwise this is akin to exactly recovering the parameters v for each player i. For example, if
x ∈ NE∗ is such that v∗Tx = 0, then it can be shown that even if ‖v∗ − v̂‖∞ = ε, for any ε
arbitrarily close to 0, then v̂Tx < 0 and therefore NE(W∗,b∗) 6= NE(Ŵ, b̂).
4
4.2. Method
Our main method for learning the structure of a sparse LIG, G∗(n, k), is based on using `1-
regularized logistic regression, to learn the parameters (w−i, bi) for each player i independently.
We denote by vi(W,b) = (w−i,−bi) the parameter vector for the i-th player, which charac-
terizes its payoff; by zi(x) = (xix−i, xi) the “feature” vector. In the rest of the paper we use
vi and zi instead of vi(W,b) and zi(x) respectively, to simplify notation. Then, we learn the
parameters for the i-th player as follows:
v̂i = argmin
vi
`(vi,D) + λ ‖vi‖1 (5)
`(vi,D) = 1
m
m∑
l=1
log(1 + exp(−vTi z(l)i )). (6)
We then set ŵ−i = [v̂i]1:(n−1) and b̂i = −[v̂i]n, where the notation [.]i:j denotes indices i to j of
the vector. We take a moment to introduce the expressions of the gradient and the Hessian of
the loss function (6), which will be useful later. The gradient and Hessian of the loss function
for any vector v and the data set D is given as follows:
∇`(v,D) = 1
m
m∑
l=1
{
−z(l)
1 + exp(vT z(l))
}
(7)
∇2`(v,D) = 1
m
m∑
l=1
η(vT z(l))z(l)z(l)
T
, (8)
where η(x) = 1/(ex/2+e−x/2)2. Finally, Hmi denotes the sample Hessian matrix with respect to the
i-th player and the true parameter v∗i , and H
∗
i denotes its expected value, i.e. H
∗
i
def
= ED [Hmi ] =
ED
[∇2`(v∗i ,D)]. In subsequent sections we drop the notational dependence of H∗i and zi on i
to simplify notation.
We show that, under the aforementioned assumptions on the true game G∗(n, k) = (W∗,b∗),
the parameters Ŵ and b̂ obtained using (6) induce the same PSNE set as the true game, i.e.,
NE(W∗,b∗) = NE(Ŵ, b̂).
4.3. Sufficient Conditions
In this section, we derive sufficient conditions on the number of samples for efficiently recovering
the PSNE set of graphical games with linear payoffs. To start with, we make the following
observation regarding the number of Nash equilibria of the game satisfying Assumption 2. The
proof of the following proposition, as well as other missing proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The number of Nash equilibria of a non-trivial game (|NE∗| ∈ [1, 2n − 1])
satisfying Assumption 2 is at most 2n−1.
We will denote the fraction of joint actions that are in the PSNE set by fNE∗
def
= |NE∗|/2n−1.
By proposition 1, fNE∗ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, our main strategy for obtaining sufficient conditions
for exact PSNE recovery guarantees is to first show that under any data distribution P that
satisfies Assumption 1, the expected loss is smooth and strongly convex, i.e., the population
Hessian matrix is positive definite and the population scatter matrix has eigenvalues bounded
by a constant. Then using tools from random matrix theory, we show that the sample Hessian
and scatter matrices are “well behaved”, i.e., are positive definite and have bounded eigenvalues
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respectively, with high probability. Then, we exploit the convexity properties of the logistic loss
function to show that the weight vectors learned using penalized logistic regression are “close”
to the true weight vectors. By our assumption that the minimum payoff in the PSNE set is
strictly greater than zero, we show that the weight vectors inferred from a finite sample of joint
actions induce the same PSNE set as the true weight vectors.
The following lemma shows that the expected Hessian matrices for each player is positive
definite and the maximum eigenvalues of the expected scatter matrices are bounded from above
by a constant.
Lemma 1. Let S be the support of the vector v, i.e., S def= {i| |vi| > 0}. There exists constant
Cmin ≥ η(‖v
∗‖1)2np˜min
2n−|NE∗| > 0 and Dmax ≤ 2npmax, such that we have λmin(H∗SS) = Cmin and
λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) = Dmax.
Proof.
λmin(H
∗
SS) = λmin
(
Ex
[
η(v∗T z)zSzTS
])
= η(‖v∗‖1)λmin(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
).
Let Z def= {zS |x ∈ X} and P def= Diag((P(x))x∈X ), where zS denotes the feature vector for the
i-th player constrained to the support set S for some i. Note that Z ∈ {−1, 1}2n×|S|; P ∈ R2n×2n
and is positive definite by our assumption that the minimum probability p˜min2n−|NE∗| > 0. Further
note that the columns of Z are orthogonal and ZTZ = 2nI|S|, where I|S| is the |S| × |S| identity
matrix. Then we have that
λmin(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) = min
{y∈R|S||‖y‖2=1}
yTZTPZy
= min
{y′∈R2n |y′=Zy/√2n∧y∈R|S|∧‖y‖2=1}
2n(y′)TPy′
≥ min
{y′∈R2n |‖y′‖2=1}
2n(y′)TPy′
= 2nλmin(P) =
2np˜min
2n − |NE∗|
Therefore, the minimum eigenvalue of H∗SS is lower bounded as follows:
λmin(H
∗
SS) = Cmin ≥
η(‖v∗‖1)2npmin
2n − |NE∗| > 0.
Similarly, the maximum eigenvalue of Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
can be bounded as λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) = λmax(Z
TPZ) ≤
2npmax.
4.3.1. Minimum and Maximum Eigenvalues of Finite Sample Hessian and Scatter
Matrices
The following technical lemma shows that the eigenvalues conditions of the expected Hessian
and scatter matrices, hold with high probability in the finite sample case.
Lemma 2. If λmin(H∗SS) ≥ Cmin, λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) ≤ Dmax, then we have that
λmin(H
m
SS) ≥
Cmin
2
, λmax
(
m∑
l=1
z
(l)
S z
(l)
S
T
)
≤ 2Dmax
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with probability at least
1− |S| exp
(−mCmin
2 |S|
)
and 1− |S| exp
(
−mp˜min
4 |S|
)
respectively.
Proof. Let
µmin
def
= λmin(H
∗
SS) and µmax
def
= λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
).
First note that for all z ∈ {−1,+1}n:
λmax(η(v
∗
S
T zS)zSz
T
S ) ≤
|S|
4
def
= R
λmax(zSz
T
S ) ≤ |S| def= R′.
Using the Matrix Chernoff bounds from Tropp [11], we have that
Pr {λmin(HmSS) ≤ (1− δ)µmin} ≤ |S|
(
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)mµmin
R
.
Setting δ = 1/2 we get that
Pr {λmin(HmSS) ≤ µmin/2} ≤ |S|
[√
2
e
] 4mµmin
|S|
≤ |S| exp
(−mCmin
2 |S|
)
.
Therefore, we have
Pr {λmin(HmSS) > Cmin/2} > 1− |S| exp
(−mCmin
2 |S|
)
.
Next, we have that
µmax = λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
)
≥ λmin(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) ≥ 2
np˜min
2n − |NE∗|
Once again invoking Theorem 1.1 from [11] and setting δ = 1 we have that
Pr {λmax ≥ (1 + δ)µmax} ≤ |S|
[
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
](mµmax)/R′
Pr {λmax ≥ 2µmax} ≤ |S|
[
e
4
](mµmax)/|S|
≤ |S| exp
(
−mµmax
4|S|
)
≤ |S| exp
(
− m2n−2p˜min|S|(2n−|NE∗|)
)
≤ |S| exp
(
−mp˜min
4|S|
)
Therefore, we have that
Pr {λmax < 2Dmax} > 1− |S| exp
(
−mp˜min
4 |S|
)
.
7
4.3.2. Recovering the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE) Set
Before presenting our main result on the exact recovery of the PSNE set from noisy observations
of joint actions, we first present a few technical lemmas that would be helpful in proving the
main result. The following lemma bounds the gradient of the loss function (6) at the true vector
v∗, for all players.
Lemma 3. With probability at least 1− δ for δ ∈ (0, 1), we have that
‖∇`(v∗,D)‖∞ < ν +
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
,
where κ = 1/(1+exp(ρmin)), ρmin ≥ 0 is the minimum payoff in the PSNE set, fNE∗ = |NE∗|/2n−1,
and
ν
def
= κ
∑
x∈NE∗
P(x) + (p˜max − p˜min)
2− fNE∗
+
fNE∗ p˜min
2− fNE∗
(9)
Proof. Consider the i-th player. Let um def= ∇`(v∗i ,D) and umj denote the j-th index of um. For
any subset S ′ ⊂ X such that |S ′| = 2n−1 define the function g(S ′) as follows:
g(S ′) def=
∑
x∈S′
P(x)f(x)−
∑
x∈S′c
P(x)f(x),
where S ′c denotes the complement of the set S ′ and f(x) = 1/1+exp(v∗i T zi(x)). For x ∈ NE∗,
f(x) ≤ κ, while for x /∈ NE∗ we have 1/2 ≤ f(x) ≤ 1. Lastly, let Sij = {x ∈ X |xixj = +1} and
Si = {x ∈ X |xi = +1}. From (7) we have that, for j 6= n,
∣∣∣E [umj ]∣∣∣ = |g(Sij)|, while for j = n∣∣∣E [umj ]∣∣∣ = |g(Si)|. Thus we get
‖um‖∞ ≤ maxS′⊂X||S′|=2n−1 g(S
′) (10)
Let S be the set that maximizes (10), A def= S ∩NE∗ and B def= Sc ∩NE∗. Continuing from
above,
|g(S)| =
∣∣∣∑
x∈S\A
P(x)f(x) +
∑
x∈A
P(x)f(x)
−
∑
x∈Sc\B
P(x)f(x)−
∑
x∈B
P(x)f(x)
∣∣∣
≤ κ
∑
x∈NE∗
P(x) +
∣∣∣∑
x∈S\A
P(x)f(x)−
∑
x∈Sc\B
P(x)f(x)
∣∣∣
Assume that the first term inside the absolute value above dominates the second term, if not
then we can proceed by reversing the two terms.
|g(S)| ≤ κ
∑
x∈NE∗
P(x) + 2
n−1p˜max − (2n−1 − |NE∗|)p˜min
2n − |NE∗|
= κ
∑
x∈NE∗
P(x) + (p˜max − p˜min) + fNE∗ p˜min
2− fNE∗
= ν
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Also note that
∣∣∣umj ∣∣∣ ≤ ν ≤ 1. Finally, from Hoeffding’s inequality [12] and using a union bound
argument over all players, we have that:
Pr
{
n
max
j=1
∣∣umj − E [umj ]∣∣ < t} > 1− 2ne−mt2/2
=⇒ Pr {‖um − E [um]‖∞ < t} > 1− 2ne−mt
2/2
=⇒ Pr {‖um‖∞ − ‖E [um]‖∞ < t} > 1− 2ne−mt
2/2
=⇒ Pr {‖um‖∞ < ν + t} > 1− 2ne−mt
2/2.
Setting 2n exp(−mt2/2) = δ, we prove our claim.
To get some intuition for the lemma above, consider the constant ν as given in (9). First,
note that κ ≤ 1/2. Also, as the minimum payoff ρmin increases, κ decays to 0 exponentially.
Similarly, if the probability measure on the non-Nash equilibria set is close to uniform, meaning
p˜max − p˜min ≈ 0, then the second term in (9) vanishes. Finally, if the fraction of actions that
are in the PSNE set (fNE∗) is small, then the third term in (9) is small. Therefore, if the
minimum payoff is high, the noise distribution, i.e., the distribution of the non-Nash equilibria
joint actions, is close to uniform, and the fraction of joint actions that are in the PSNE set is
small, then the expected gradient vanishes. In the following technical lemma we show that the
optimal vector v̂ for the logistic regression problem is close to the true vector v∗ in the support
set S of v∗. Next, in Lemma 5, we bound the difference between the true vector v∗ and the
optimal vector v̂ in the non-support set. The lemmas together show that the optimal vector is
close to the true vector.
Lemma 4. If the regularization parameter λ satisfies the following condition:
λ ≤ 5C
2
min
16 |S|Dmax − ν −
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
,
then
‖v∗S − v̂S‖2 ≤
5Cmin
4
√|S|Dmax ,
with probability at least 1− (δ + |S| exp((−mCmin)/2|S|) + |S| exp(−mp˜min/4|S|)).
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the general proof structure of Lemma 3 in [9]. First, we
reparameterize the `1-regularized loss function
f(vS) = `(vS) + λ ‖vS‖1
as the loss function f˜ , which gives the loss at a point that is ∆S distance away from the true
parameter v∗S as : f˜(∆S) = `(v
∗
S +∆S)− `(v∗S)+λ(‖v∗S + ∆S‖1−‖v∗S‖1), where ∆S = vS−v∗S .
Also note that the loss function f˜ is shifted such that the loss at the true parameter v∗S is 0,
i.e., f˜(0) = 0. Further, note that the function f˜ is convex and is minimized at ∆̂S = v̂S − v∗S ,
since v̂S minimizes f . Therefore, clearly f˜(∆̂S) ≤ 0. Thus, if we can show that the function f˜
is strictly positive on the surface of a ball of radius b, then the point ∆̂S lies inside the ball i.e.,
‖v̂S − v∗S‖2 ≤ b. Using the Taylor’s theorem we expand the first term of f˜ to get the following:
f˜(∆S) = ∇`(v∗S)T∆S + ∆TS∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)∆S
+ λ(‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1), (11)
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for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Next, we lower bound each of the terms in (11). Using the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality, the first term in (11) is bounded as follows:
∇`(v∗S)T∆S ≥ −‖∇`(v∗S)‖∞ ‖∆S‖1
≥ −‖∇`(v∗S)‖∞
√
|S| ‖∆S‖2
≥ −b
√
|S|
(
ν +
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
, (12)
with probability at least 1 − δ for δ ∈ [0, 1]. It is also easy to upper bound the last term in
equation 11, using the reverse triangle inequality as follows:
λ |‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1| ≤ λ ‖∆S‖1 .
Which then implies the following lower bound:
λ(‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1) ≥ −λ ‖∆S‖1
≥ −λ
√
|S| ‖∆S‖2
= −λ
√
|S|b. (13)
Now we turn our attention to computing a lower bound of the second term of (11), which is a
bit more involved.
∆TS∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)∆S ≥ min‖∆S‖2=b
∆TS∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)∆S
= b2λmin(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)).
Now,
λmin(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S))
≥ min
θ∈[0,1]
λmin
(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S))
= min
θ∈[0,1]
λmin
( 1
m
m∑
l=1
η((v∗S + θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
)
Again, using the Taylor’s theorem to expand the function η we get
η((v∗S + θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )
= η((v∗S)
T z
(l)
S ) + η
′((v∗S + θ¯∆S)
T z
(l)
S )(θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S
, where θ¯ ∈ [0, θ]. Finally, from Lemma 2 we have, with probability at least 1−|S| exp((−mCmin)/2|S|):
λmin
(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S))
≥ min
θ∈[0,1]
λmin
( 1
m
m∑
l=1
η((v∗S)
T z
(l)
S )z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
+
1
m
m∑
l=1
η′((v∗S + θ¯∆S)
T z
(l)
S )((θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
)
≥ λmin(HmSS)− max
θ∈[0,1]
|||A(θ)|||2
≥ Cmin
2
− max
θ∈[0,1]
|||A(θ)|||2,
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where we have defined
A(θ)
def
=
1
m
m∑
l=1
η′((v∗S + θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )×
(θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T .
Next, the spectral norm of A(θ) can be bounded as follows:
|||A(θ)|||2
≤ max
‖y‖2=1
{
1
m
m∑
l=1
∣∣∣η′((v∗S + θ∆S)T z(l)S )∣∣∣ ∣∣∣((θ∆S)T z(l)S )∣∣∣
× yT (z(l)S (z(l)S )T )y
}
< max
‖y‖2=1
1
(10m)
m∑
l=1
‖(θ∆S)‖1
∥∥∥z(l)S ∥∥∥∞ yT (z(l)S (z(l)S )T )y
≤ θ max
‖y‖2=1
{
1
10m
m∑
l=1
√
|S| ‖∆S‖2 yT (z(l)S (z(l)S )T )y
}
= θb
√
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 110m
m∑
l=1
z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ (b
√|S|Dmax)
5
≤ Cmin
4
,
where in the second line we used the fact that η′(.) < 1/10 and in the last line we assumed that
(b
√
|S|Dmax)
5 ≤ Cmin/4 — an assumption that we verify momentarily. Having upper bounded the
spectral norm of A(θ), we have
λmin
(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)) ≥ Cmin4 . (14)
Plugging back the bounds given by (12), (13) and (14) in (11) and equating to zero we get
−b
√
|S|
(
ν +
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
+
b2Cmin
4
− λ
√
|S|b = 0
=⇒ b = 4
√|S|
Cmin
(
λ+ ν +
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
.
Finally, coming back to our prior assumption we have
b =
4
√|S|
Cmin
(
λ+ ν +
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
≤ 5Cmin
4
√|S|Dmax .
The above assumption holds if the regularization parameter λ is bounded as follows:
λ ≤ 5C
2
min
16 |S|Dmax −
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
− ν.
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Lemma 5. If the regularization parameter λ satisfies the following condition:
λ ≥ ν +
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
,
then we have that
‖v̂ − v∗‖1 ≤
5Cmin
Dmax
with probability at least 1− (δ + |S| exp((−mCmin)/2|S|) + |S| exp(−mp˜min/4|S|)).
Now we are ready to present our main result on recovering the true PSNE set.
Theorem 1. If for all i, |Si| ≤ k, the minimum payoff ρmin ≥ 5Cmin/Dmax, and the regularization
parameter and the number of samples satisfy the following conditions:
ν +
√
2
m
log
6n2
δ
≤ λ ≤ 2K + ν −
√
2
m
log
6n2
δ
(15)
m ≥ max
{
2
K2
log
(
6n2
δ
)
,
2k
Cmin
log
(
3kn
δ
)
,
4k
p˜min
log
(
3kn
δ
)}
, (16)
where K def= 5C2min/32kDmax − ν, then with probability at least 1− δ, for δ ∈ (0, 1), we recover the
true PSNE set, i.e., NE(Ŵ, b̂) = NE(W∗,b∗).
Proof. From Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and Lemma 5 we have∣∣(v̂i − v∗i )T zi∣∣ ≤ ‖v̂i − v∗i ‖1 ‖zi‖∞ ≤ 5CminDmax .
Therefore, we have that
(v∗i )
T zi − 5Cmin
Dmax
≤ v̂Ti zi ≤ (v∗i )T zi +
5Cmin
Dmax
.
Now, if ∀ x ∈ NE∗, (v∗i )T zi ≥ 5Cmin/Dmax, then v̂Ti zi ≥ 0. Using an union bound argument over
all players i, we can show that the above holds with probability at least
1− n(δ + k exp((−mCmin)/2k) + k exp((−mp˜min)/4k) (17)
for all players. Therefore, we have that NE(Ŵ, b̂) = NE∗ with high probability. Finally, setting
δ = δ′/3n, for some δ′ ∈ [0, 1], and ensuring that the last two terms in (17) are at most δ′/3n each,
we prove our claim.
To better understand the implications of the theorem above, we instantiate it for the global
and local noise model.
Remark 1 (Sample complexity under global noise model). Recall that Dmax ≤ min(k, 2npmax),
and for the global noise model given by (3) pmax = qg/|NE∗|. If qg is constant, then Dmax =
k. Then K = Ω (1/k2), and the sample complexity of learning sparse linear games grows as
O (k4 log n). However, if qg is small enough, i.e., qg = O (|NE∗|/2n), then Dmax is no longer a
function of k and K = Ω (1/k). Hence, the sample complexity scales as O (k2 log n) for exact
PSNE recovery.
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Next, we consider the implications of Theorem 1 under the local noise model given by (4). we
consider the regime where the parameter q scales with the number of players n.
Remark 2 (Sample complexity under local noise). In the local noise model if the number of
Nash-equilibria is constant, then pmax = O (exp(−n)), and once again Dmax becomes independent
of k, which results in a sample complexity of O (k2 log n).
Also, observe the dependence of the sample complexity on the minimum noise level p˜min. The
number of samples required to recover the PSNE set increases as p˜min decreases. From the
aforementioned remarks we see that if the noise level is too low, i.e., p˜min → 0, then number
of samples needed goes to infinity; This seems counter-intuitive — with reduced noise level, a
learning problem should become easier and not harder. To understand this seemingly counter-
intuitive behavior, first observe that the constant Dmax/Cmin can be thought of as the “condition
number” of the loss function given by (6). Then, the sample complexity as given by Theorem
1 can be written as O
(
k2D2max
C2min
log n
)
. Hence, we have that as the noise level gets too low, the
Hessian of the loss becomes ill-conditioned, since the data set now comprises of many repetitions
of the few joint-actions that are in the PSNE set; thereby increasing the dependency (Dmax)
between actions of players in the sample data set.
4.4. Necessary Conditions
In this section we derive necessary conditions on the number of samples required to learn graph-
ical games. Our approach for doing so is information-theoretic: we treat the inference procedure
as a communication channel and then use the Fano’s inequality to lower bound the estimation
error. Such techniques have been widely used to obtain necessary conditions for model selection
in graphical models, see e.g. [13, 14], sparsity recovery in linear regression [15], and many other
problems.
Consider an ensemble Gn of n-player games with the in-degree of each player being at most
k. Nature picks a true game G∗ ∈ G, and then generates a data set D of m joint actions. A
decoder is any function ψ : Xm → Gn that maps a data set D to a game, ψ(D), in Gn. The
minimum estimation error over all decoders ψ, for the ensemble Gn, is then given as follows:
perr
def
= min
ψ
max
G∗∈Gn
Pr {NE(ψ(D)) 6= NE(G∗)} , (18)
where the probability is computed over the data distribution. Our objective here is to compute
the number of samples below which PSNE recovery fails with probability greater than 1/2.
Theorem 2. The number of samples required to learn graphical games over n players and in-
degree of at most k, is Ω (k log n).
Remark 3. From the above theorem and from Theorem 1 we observe that the method of l1-
regularized logistic regression for learning graphical games, operates close to the fundamental
limit of Ω (k log n).
Results from simulation experiments for both global and local noise model can be found in
Appendix B.
Concluding Remarks. An interesting direction for future work would be to consider structured
actions — for instance permutations, directed spanning trees, directed acyclic graphs among oth-
ers — thereby extending the formalism of linear influence games to the structured prediction
setting. Other ideas that might be worth pursuing are: considering mixed strategies, corre-
lated equilibria and epsilon Nash equilibria, and incorporating latent or unobserved actions and
variables in the model.
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Appendix A Detailed Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let |NE∗| > 2n−1. Then by the pigeon hole principle there are at least
two joint actions x and x′ in NE∗ such that x = −x′. Since the payoff is strictly positive,
it follows that the bias bi for each player must be 0. If the bias for all players is 0, then for
each x ∈ NE∗, −x ∈ NE∗. Therefore, |NE∗| = 2n. Since we have assumed that the game is
non-trivial, we get a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 5. Define ∆ def= v̂ − v∗. Also for any vector y let the notation yS denote the
vector y with the entries not in the support, S, set to zero, i.e.[
yS
]
i
=
{
yi if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Similarly, let the notation ySc denote the vector y with the entries not in S
c set to zero, where
Sc is the complement of S. Having introduced our notation and since, S is the support of the
true vector v∗, we have by definition that v∗ = v∗
S
. We then have, using the reverse triangle
inequality,
‖v̂‖1 = ‖v∗ + ∆‖1 =
∥∥v∗
S
+ ∆S + ∆Sc
∥∥
1
=
∥∥v∗
S
− (−∆S)
∥∥
1
+
∥∥∆Sc∥∥1
≥ ‖v∗‖1 −
∥∥∆S∥∥1 + ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 . (19)
Also, from the optimality of v̂ for the `1-regularized problem we have that
`(v∗) + λ ‖v∗‖1 ≥ `(v̂) + λ ‖v̂‖1
=⇒ λ(‖v∗‖1 − ‖v̂‖1) ≥ `(v̂)− `(v∗). (20)
Next, from convexity of `(.) and using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have that
`(v̂)− `(v∗) ≥ ∇`(v∗)T (v̂ − v∗)
≥ −‖∇`(v∗)‖∞ ‖∆‖1
≥ −λ
2
‖∆‖1 , (21)
in the last line we used the fact that λ ≥ ‖∇`(v∗)‖∞. Thus, we have from (19), (20) and (21)
that
1
2
‖∆‖1 ≥ ‖v̂‖1 − ‖v∗‖1
=⇒ 1
2
‖∆‖1 ≥
∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 − ∥∥∆S∥∥1
=⇒ 1
2
∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 + 12 ∥∥∆S∥∥1 ≥ ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 − ∥∥∆S∥∥1
=⇒ 3 ∥∥∆S∥∥1 ≥ ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 . (22)
Finally, from (22) and Lemma 4 we have that
‖∆‖1 =
∥∥∆S∥∥1 + ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1
≤ 4 ∥∥∆S∥∥1 ≤ 4√|S|∥∥∆S∥∥2
≤ 5Cmin
Dmax
.
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Proof of Theorem 2. First, we construct a restricted ensemble of games G˜ ⊂ G as follows. Each
game G ∈ G˜ contains k, randomly chosen, influential players. The game graph for G is then
chosen to be a complete directed bipartite graph from the set of k influential players to the set
of n− k non-influential players. The edge weights are all set to −1, the bias for the k influential
players is set to +1, while the bias for the remaining n − k players is set to 0. Then it is clear
that each game in G˜ induces a distinct size-one PSNE set. Specifically, for a game G ∈ G˜, a
joint action x ∈ NE(G) is such that xi = −1 if player i is influential in G, otherwise xi = +1.
Also, note that the minimum payoff in the PSNE set of each game in G˜ is strictly positive, and
is precisely 1. Finally, we assume that the data set is drawn according to the global noise model
(3), with q = 1/n. Now let G ∈ G˜ be a uniformly-distributed random variable corresponding to
the game that was picked by nature. From the Fano’s inequality, we have that:
perr ≥ 1− I(D;G) + log 2
H(G) , (23)
where I(.) denotes mutual information and H(.) denotes entropy. Since, G is uniformly dis-
tributed, we have that H(G) = log ∣∣G˜∣∣ = log (nk) ≥ k(log n − log k). Let PD|G=G1 be the
conditional distribution of the data set given a game G1 ∈ G˜. We bound the mutual information
I(D;G) by a pairwise KL-based bound from [16] as follows:
I(D;G) ≤ 1∣∣G˜∣∣ ∑G1∈G˜
∑
G2∈G˜
KL
(PD|G=G1∥∥PD|G=G2) . (24)
Now from the fact that data are sampled i.i.d , we get:
KL
(PD|G=G1∥∥PD|G=G2)
= m
∑
x∈X PD|G=G1(x) log
PD|G=G1 (x)
PD|G=G2 (x)
= m
{
q log q(2
n−1)
1−q +
1−q
2n−1 log
1−q
q(2n−1)
}
= m(2
nq−1)
2n−1
(
log q − log
(
1−q
2n−1
))
≤ m log 2, (25)
where the last line comes from the fact that q = 1/n. Putting together (23), (24) and (25), and
setting perr = 1/2, we get
m ≤ k log n− k log k − 2 log 2
2 log 2
.
By observing that learning the ensemble G is at least as hard as learning a subset of the ensemble
G˜, we prove our main claim.
Appendix B Experiments
In order to verify that our results and assumptions indeed hold in practice, we performed various
simulation experiments. We generated random LIGs for n players and exactly k neighbors by
first creating a matrix W of all zeros and then setting k off-diagonal entries of each row, chosen
uniformly at random, to −1. We set the bias for all players to 0. We found that any odd value
of k produces games with strictly positive payoff in the PSNE set. Therefore, for each value of k
16
in {1, 3, 5}, and n in {10, 12, 15, 20}, we generated 40 random LIGs. For experiments involving
the local noise model, we only used n ∈ {10, 12, 15}. The parameter δ was set to the constant
value of 0.01. For the global noise model, the parameters qg was set to 0.01, while for the local
noise model we used q1 = . . . = qn = 0.6. The regularization parameter λ was set according
to Theorem 1 as some constant multiple of
√
(2/m) log(2n/δ). Figure 1 shows the probability of
successful recovery of the PSNE, for various combinations of (n, k), where the probability was
computed as the fraction of the 40 randomly sampled LIGs for which the learned PSNE set
matched the true PSNE set exactly. For each experiment, the number of samples was computed
as: b(C)(10c)(k2 log(6n2/δ))c, where c is the control parameter and the constant C is 10000 for
k = 1 and 1000 for k = 3 and 5. Thus, from Figure 1 we see that, the sample complexity of
O (k2 log n) as given by Theorem 1 indeed holds in practice, i.e., there exists constants c and c′
such that if the number of samples is less than ck2 log n, we fail to recover the PSNE set exactly
with high probability, while if the number of samples is greater than c′k2 log n then we are able
to recover the PSNE set exactly, with high probability. Further, the scaling remains consistent
as the number of players n is changed from 10 to 20.
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Figure 1: The probability of exact recovery of the PSNE set computed across 40 randomly
sampled LIGs, using the global noise model (TOP) and local noise model (BOTTOM),
as the number of samples is scaled as b(C)(10c)(k2 log(6n2/δ))c, where c is the control
parameter and the constant C is 10000 for the k = 1 case and 1000 for the remaining
two case. For the global noise model we set qg = 0.001, while for the local noise model
we used q1 = . . . = qn = 0.6.
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